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Economists are widely familiar with the Ricardian equivalence thesis. It
maintains that, given the time-path of government spending, a change
in taxation does not alter the set of feasible life-time consumption plans
of the households and affects neither the demand for commodities and
services nor the rate of interest, provided the households act rationally.
In this note a surprising finding is established. Assuming that the agents
in a standard infinite horizon growth model hold the very expectations the
thesis proposes (“Ricardian expectations”), it is shown that these expec-
tations are invalidated. This divergence from the Ricardian equivalence
thesis is traced to the omission of interest payments on public debt as part
of the households’ disposable income. The non-equivalence is valid in a
wide class of models.
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1 Introduction
The Ricardian equivalence thesis, originally developed by Robert Barro (1974,
1979) has become a standard topic in every macroeconomic textbook. It es-
tablishes the set of feasible life-time consumption plans of the households as
determined by the time-path of government spending. Provided the households
act rationally, it is asserted that this set remains unaltered by a change in taxa-
tion. Therefore, neither the demand for commodities and services nor the rate
of interest are affected.
In this note, the Ricardian equivalence thesis is re-examined in detail. At
the start, it is assumed that the agents exhibit “Ricardian behavior”: behavior
that is rational if “Ricardian expectations” prevail. Ricardian expectations are
the expectations Barro suggests as being rational. The analysis produces an
unexpected result: the Ricardian expectations are defeated.
First, the original formulation of Barro’s argument is provided as a point of
reference (Section 2). Then, an example of an economy in steady-state growth is
is outlined where all households exhibit Ricardian behavior, but their Ricardian
expectations are not fulfilled (Section 3).
To elucidate the reason for this odd finding, Barro’s original argument is
examined step by step (Section 4). It is shown that Barro’s thesis depends on the
unwarranted implicit assumption that interest payments on public debt do not
contribute to the households’ disposable income.
The example shows that there is no economic necessity to balance less taxes
to-day with offsetting larger taxes in the future, but there may be political reasons
for introducing limits on public debt. If a zero limit on government debt is
enforced by law, this may render Ricardian behavior prudent ex post, but this
does not salvage the Ricardian equivalence thesis (Section 5). Finally it is shown
that the criticism of the Ricardian equivalence thesis developed in the example
carries over to the general case of arbitrary growth paths (Section 6).
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2 Barro’s Argument
Let us start by recapitulating the Ricardian equivalence thesis. Robert Barro
(1979, 38f.) explains it as follows.
The Ricardian . . . analysis begins with the observation that, for a
given path of government spending, a deficit-financed cut in current
taxes leads to higher future taxes that have the same present value
as the initial cut. This result follows from the government’s budget
constraint, which equates total expenditures for each period (includ-
ing interest payments) to revenues from taxation or other sources
and the net issue of interest-bearing public debt. Abstracting from
chain-letter cases where the public debt can grow forever at the rate
of interest or higher, the present value of taxes (and other revenues)
cannot change unless the government changes the present value of
its expenditures. . . . Hence, holding fixed the path of government
expenditures and non-tax revenues, a cut in today’s taxes must be
matched by a corresponding increase in the present value of future
taxes.
Suppose now that households’ demands for goods depend on the
expected present value of taxes - that is, each household subtracts
its share of this present value from the expected present value of
income to determine a net wealth position. Then fiscal policy would
affect aggregate consumer demand only if it altered the expected
present value of taxes. But the preceding argument was that the
present value of taxes would not change as long as the present value
of spending did not change. Therefore, the substitution of a budget
deficit for current taxes (or any other rearrangement of the timing
of taxes) has no impact on the aggregate demand for goods. In this
sense, budget deficits and taxation have equivalent effects on the
economy - hence the term, “Ricardian equivalence theorem.”
To put the equivalence result another way, a decrease in the govern-
ment’s saving (that is, a current budget deficit) leads to an offsetting
increase in desired private saving, and hence to no change in de-
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sired national saving. Since desired national saving does not change,
the real interest rate does not have to rise in a closed economy to
maintain balance between desired national saving and investment
demand. Hence, there is no effect on investment, and no burden of
the public debt or social security. (Barro, 1989, 38f.)
This explanation can hardly be improved upon. Due to its transparency and
lucidity, the argument has logical appeal (Romer, 1995, 72). It is so convincing
that the Ricardian equivalence thesis became a staple topic in public finance.
3 An Example
Consider the standard infinite horizon model of a closed economy in steady
state growth that grows at the nominal rate g . Production at time t is X t , private
expenditure (consumption plus investment) is Et , taxes are Tt and government
expenditure is Gt .
Production and government expenditure grow both with rate g . So we have
X t =
(
1+ g )t X0 (1)
Gt =
(
1+ g )t G0 (2)
X constitutes the sum-total of pre-tax income, that is, wages plus income
from capital ownership, but it does not include income from interest on govern-
ment bonds, to be introduced later.
The economy is initially in full equilibrium with an interest rate r > g . The
rate of interest is assumed to exceed the growth rate. This assumption is also
made by Barro; otherwise the present values used in his argument would not
exist.
Private expenditure E and government expenditure G add up to total pro-
duction, and the expectation held by all parties is that this will continue in the
future:
Et +Gt = X t . (3)
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Up to t =−1, the government budget was balanced, and the taxes levied in any
period t < 0 were equal to government spending Gt in that period. Call this the
“pay-as-you-go regime.” All parties have expected and expect that this policy
would continue throughout the future, but government changes its policy and
decides to run a permanent deficit of a fraction α ∈ (0,1) of its expenditure Gt
in each period, beginning at t = 0 while leaving government expenditure Gt
unchanged. So government expenditure remains as described in equation (13).
Call this the “debt regime.”
Let D t denote government debt. Initially there is no government debt:
D0 = 0. (4)
In line with Barro’s (1974; 1989) analysis, the households and firms expect
that the change in policy does not affect the present value of their lifetime
income stream. Hence they believe that “rearrangements of the timing of taxes –
as implied by budget deficits – have no first-order effect on the economy” (Barro,
1989, 51). They conclude that, sooner or later, the government has to increase
taxes, leaving the present value of their incomes unaltered. So they change
neither consumption nor investment. In short, everybody in the private sector
holds “Ricardian expectations” and behaves accordingly – everyone exhibits
“Ricardian behavior.”
In each period t = 0,1,2... the deficit is αGt , and outstanding government
debt D increases by this amount. Therefore we have
D0 = 0 (5)
D t+1 = D t +αGt . (6)
This implies together with (2)
D t = 1
g
((
1+ g )t −1)αG0. (7)
Hence debt grows asymptotically in proportion with production. The ratio of
government debt to government expenditure approaches α/g and the ratio of
government debt to production approaches α/g times the share of government
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expenditure in total production.
lim
t→∞
D t
Gt
= α
g
, lim
t→∞
D t
X t
= α
g
G0
X0
. (8)
As the government keeps its expenditure on goods, services and manpower
G unaltered and runs a deficit, its budget, denoted by B , will exceed expenditure
G by interest payments r D on public debt:
Bt =Gt + r D t . (9)
The share of interest payments in the government budget is
r D t
Bt
=
((
1+ g )t −1)rα(
1+ g )t g + ((1+ g )t −1)rα (10)
and approaches
lim
t→∞
r D t
Bt
= rα
g + rα . (11)
So for a growth rate of 2 percent (g = 0.02), a rate of interest of 4 percent
(r = 0.04), and a deficit rate of 10 per cent (α= 0.1) this ratio would approach 17
percent.
The present value of government debt D t is(
1
1+ r
)t
D t = α
g
(
(1+ g )t −1
(1+ r )t
)
G0. (12)
As r > g is assumed, the present value of the debt is a positive number and
goes to zero for t →∞ although debt is never retired.
The deficit in period 0 is αG0. It is entailed by the tax reduction of the same
size. So we have tax receipts of T0 = (1−α)G0 in period 0. In period 1 government
debt is D1 =αG0. This requires interest payments r D1. The deficit in period 1
is the sum of government expenditure G1 plus interest payments r D minus tax
receipts T1. The deficit is to be αG1. Hence we have
G1+ r D1−T1 =αG1.
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A similar consideration applies to all periods:
Gt + r D t −Tt =αGt . (13)
Solving for Tt gives the amount of taxes to be collected in period t :
Tt = (1−α)Gt + r D t . (14)
Furthermore, the ratio of taxes to production approaches
lim
t→∞
Tt
X t
=
(
1+
(
r − g )α
g
)
· Go
Xo
> Go
Xo
. (15)
For r > g the government collects higher taxes under the debt regime than under
the pay-as-you-go regime. Comparing interest payments r D necessary under a
debt regime with the tax increase entailed by switching from the pay-as-you-go
regime to the debt regime (which is T −G) yields
lim
t→∞
(
r D t
X t
− Tt −Gt
X t
)
= αGo
Xo
> 0. (16)
In the long term, the switch to a debt regimes leads to additional interest pay-
ments that exceed the necessary increase of taxation.
Now consider the present value of the households disposable income. Define
for any time series x the function
Ω (x)=
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1+ r
)t
xt (17)
which gives the present value of the time series x. It is linear:
Ω
(
x+ y) = Ω (x)+Ω(y) (18)
Ω (ax) = aΩ (x) for any a ∈R. (19)
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If the government would run a balanced budget all the time, the households
discounted disposable income would have been
Ω (X −G) =
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1+ r
)t
(X t −Gt )
= (X0−G0)
∞∑
t=0
(
1+ g
1+ r
)t
= 1+ r
r − g (X0−G0) . (20)
The debt policy, however, results in disposable income
Yt = X t −Tt + r D t (21)
which is
Yt =
(
1+ g )t (X0− (1−α)G0) .
= X t − (1−α)Gt > X t −Gt . (22)
Under the pay-as-you-go regime, disposable income in each period would
have been X t −Gt . Hence the switch from the pay-as-you-go regime to the debt
regime has increased disposable income for all periods by the fraction α of govern-
ment expenditure Gt .
The present value of disposable income is
Ω (Y ) =
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1+ r
)t
Yt .
This is calculated as
Ω (Y )= 1+ r
r − g · (X0− (1−α)G0) (23)
The difference between this present value of disposable income under the debt
regime and the corresponding present value under the pay-as-you-go regime
(20) is
Ω (Y )−Ω (X −G)= 1+ r
r − g αG0 > 0. (24)
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Hence the present value of the households’ lifetime income has increased by switch-
ing from the pay-as-you-go regime to the debt regime. The Barro expectations
held by the subjects are not fulfilled. The necessity for tax increases, that they be-
lieved to be unavoidable, never arises. The households engage in precautionary
savings in order to finance tax increases that need never occur.
As the value of their lifetime income stream has increased, they could have
afforded higher expenditure, with more consumption and more investment. This
would have presumably affected the rate of interest and the value of production
and income in turn. Any of these reactions would have invalidated the Barro-
Ricardo equivalence.
4 Solving the Contradiction
In the above example, Ricardian expectations are not fulfilled in presence of
Ricardian behavior. This surprising result is at odds with Barro’s argument as
given earlier (Section 2). So let us consider Barro’s argument in the context of
the above example.
First note that the example does not involve what Barro calls a “chain letter
case.” Government debt grows eventually with the growth rate g that is below
the rate of interest. The present value of government debt is well defined and
goes to zero for t →∞; see equation (12).
Barro gives the governments budget constraint as equating total expenditure
plus interest payments on government debt with revenue from taxation and the
net issue of interest-bearing public debt. In the context of the example this can
be written as
Gt + r D t = T +αGt (25)
and is equivalent to equations (13), (14) in the example.
Next consider the present value of taxes. From equations (7) and (14) the
present value of taxes is calculated as
Ω (T )= (1+ r )
r − g G0. (26)
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The expression is independent of α. Hence Barro’s assertion that “the present
value of taxes would not change as long as the present value of spending did not
change” is satisfied in the example. Further, the present value of government
expenditure, as obtained from equation (2) has the same value
Ω (G)= (1+ r )
r − g G0. (27)
Barro goes on to explain that each household subtracts its share of the
present value of taxes from the expected present value of income to determine a
net wealth position. This formulation does not consider the interest payments
on government debt that are paid out of taxes under the debt regime. The correct
statement would be: each household subtracts its share of present value of net
taxes (taxes minus interest payments on government debt) from the expected
present value of income to determine a net wealth position.
While the present value of the tax burden remains unchanged by a switch in
the tax regime, the present value of net taxes changes with such a switch. This
destroys the Barro-Ricardo equivalence.
Using equation (7), the present value of interest payments on government
bonds r D is calculated as
Ω (r D) = (1+ r )
r − g αG0. (28)
This expression is identical to the difference between the present values of
income under the debt regime and under the pay-as-you-go regime as given in
equation (24). The argument given in Section 2 does not take into account that,
under the debt regime, part of the tax finances interest payments that increase
the disposable income of the households. Although the present value of taxes
remains unaffected by a switch in the tax regime, net taxes and the present value
of disposable income are affected by such a switch.
5 Political Restrictions on Government Debt
Ricardian expectations rest on the thesis that tax reductions to-day entail, by
economic necessity, offsetting tax increases later. This thesis – the Ricardian
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equivalence thesis – turns out to be not true. Still there may arise political
reasons for such tax increases, and people may harbor Ricardian expectations
and consequently exhibit Ricardian behavior for political reasons. After all, the
absence of tax increases in the past does not rule out tax increases at some point
of time in the indefinite future. There is not, and can never be, direct evidence
shaking Ricardian beliefs as long as the debt regime is kept in place.
So assume that new politicians attain power. They write the pay-as-you-
go policy into the constitution. With such an austerity shock, the Ricardian
expectations seem to be vindicated and the Ricardian behavior fully justified.
Assume that the shock occurs at time T . At that time, government debt is
DT = 1g
((
1+ g )T −1)αG0, see equation (7). This capital is collected through an
additional austerity tax, and is used to repay the government’s debt to the debtors.
So the households pay DT in additional taxes and obtain DT as the repayment
for the government debt they hold. Things have developed as expected. The
households have acted optimally.
This observation does not vindicate the Ricardian equivalence thesis, how-
ever. The thesis says that a change in the fiscal regime does not matter. If the
pay-as-you-go policy is cemented in the constitution, it remains still true that a
switch to the debt regime would entail real consequences.
It is important to note, however, that the austerity shock is not occasioned by
any economic necessity as the Ricardian equivalence thesis seems to suggest. It is,
in this case, brought about by an “arbitrary” policy decision. If this decision was
inspired by the Ricardian equivalence thesis, it was flawed from the beginning.
6 Arbitrary Growth Paths
The argument made in the example given in Section 3 about Ricardian expecta-
tions can be easily generalized to arbitrary growth paths. We keep assumption
(3)
Et +Gt = X t (29)
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for all t , along with Et > 0 and Gt > 0, but drop assumptions (1) and (2). We
permit the rate of interest to vary over time, too, and write rt for the rate at time
t .
Equations (5), (6), (14), and (21) remain valid, and we end up with disposable
income
Yt = X t − (1−α)Gt > X t −Gt (30)
which is identical to the result (22) obtained in the steady-state case: disposable
income increases by the deficit αG . Note also that inequality (30) is valid inde-
pendently of the level of interest, and regardless of whether the present values
of production and government spending exists or not. This, because net taxes
(taxes minus interest income on government bonds received) are (1−α)G , and
they, rather than total taxes T = (1−α)G+ r D, are to be deduced from pre-tax
income X in order to arrive at disposable income.
Consider the case that the relevant present values exist. The present value
function (17) is now defined as
Ω (x)=
∞∑
t=0
( t∏
τ=0
1
(1+ rτ)
)
xt . (31)
Assume that the present value of production is finite:
Ω (X )<∞ (32)
This assumption corresponds to the case that the rate of interest exceeds the
growth rate in the in the steady state case. As 0<Gt < X t for all t holds true by
assumption (29), the present values of disposable income under the pay-as-you-
go regime and under the debt regime are finite
Ω (X −G) = Ω (X )−Ω (G)<∞ (33)
Ω (Y ) = Ω (X )− (1−α)Ω (G)<∞. (34)
The present value of disposable income under the debt regime exceeds that
under the pay-as-you-go regime by the present value of the deficit:
Ω (Y )− (Ω (X −G))=αΩ (G)> 0. (35)
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As Ricardian equivalence requires Ricardian behavior and Ricardian expec-
tations, the violation of Ricardian expectations induced by Ricardian behavior in
such a very general setting proves that the Ricardian equivalence thesis cannot
rationally be upheld.
7 Discussion
The analysis has presupposed throughout that all agents hold Ricardian expec-
tations and exhibit Ricardian behavior. It has been shown that, under these
unrealistic assumptions, disposable income is higher under a debt regime than
under a pay-as-you go regime, in violation of Ricardian expectations. Under
the debt regime, government debt is never fully retired while all intertempo-
ral budget constraints are satisfied. These assertions apply to all conceivable
inter-temporal equilibria, regardless of the model chosen (Section 6). Ricardian
expectations are, in this sense, irrational.
The argument is entirely hypothetical. It addresses an internal inconsistency
of the Ricardian position while asserting absolutely nothing under consistent, let
alone realistic, assumptions about expectations and behavior. As a contradiction
does not imply anything, the above analysis affirms nothing about the economic
effects of alternative fiscal regimes, like whether government debt increases
or decreases the rate of interest, or investment, or consumption. The only
statement made is that Ricardian expectations are defied by Ricardian behavior,
and that the Ricardian equivalence thesis is logically wrong. In view of the
importance sometimes bestowed on the Ricardian equivalence thesis, such an
an observation seems to be of some relevance. The thesis has, for instance,
been characterized by a leading and prominent proponent as “the theorem that
[fiscal] stimulus does not work in a well-functioning economy” (Cochrane, 2011)
and has been considered “central to macroeconomics and policy making, given
that many countries are currently facing increasing fiscal imbalances” (Briotti,
2005, 4).
The many criticisms raised against the validity of the Ricardian equivalence
thesis have, to the best of my knowledge, never challenged the theoretical va-
lidity of the thesis but rather questioned some assumptions made by Barro. In
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his influential assessment of Barro’s thesis, Buchanan (1976, 341) has stated for
instance: “I have not challenged [Barro’s] basic conclusion that future taxes will
tend to be fully discounted save under the exceptions that he notes. Nonethe-
less, this conclusion may be questioned on empirical grounds”. In a similar
vein, Romer (2011, 596) writes: “if the permanent-income hypothesis describes
consumption behavior well, Ricardian equivalence is likely to be a good approx-
imation. But significant departures from the permanent-income hypothesis
can lead to significant departures from Ricardian equivalence.” and that “the
permanent-income hypothesis fails in important ways.” These arguments erro-
neously take for granted that Barro’s reasoning is correct as far as it goes.
In another line of criticism, directed against Barro’s assumption of utility-
maximizing family dynasties, Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) have maintained
that this assumption would give rise “to a host of neutrality results, including the
irrelevance of all public distributions, distortionary taxes, and prices” and that
all this would be unrealistic and absurd. This note shows that Bernheim and
Bagwell (1988) concede too much to Barro, as the equivalence result is clearly
invalid even for the case that all families are immortal.
The only theoretical criticism I know of has been advanced by Feldstein
(1976). He noted that Barro’s argument brakes down if the rate of growth exceeds
the rate of interest, not only in the sense that the relevant present values would
not exist and Barro’s argument would not go through, but also in the sense that
government debt must not necessarily be fully repaid under such circumstances.
Barro (1976, 345) concurred but noted that such a state would not be feasible
because “in a model of a utility-maximizing immortal family [. . . ] the solution
with r < g in a steady state would be untenable”, as such dynastic families could
go indefinitely into debt, just like government. The argument outlined in Sec-
tion 6 takes account of that position by leaving open which states are feasible
and which are not. As it has been shown there that the equivalence thesis is
wrong whenever an intertemporal equilibrium exists, that argument general-
izes, in some sense, Feldstein’s criticism. Yet Feldstein, along with Buchanan,
Romer, Bernheim, and Bagwell, has accepted the logic of Barro’s exposition and
overlooked the inconsistency involved here.
The theoretical invalidity of the equivalence thesis is unrelated to the empir-
ical validity or invalidity of whatever is seen as empirical Ricardian equivalence.
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So even if it is found, as in Evans (1985), that large government deficits do not af-
fect interest rates, this cannot be taken as evidence for the Ricardian equivalence
thesis as a theoretical proposition. Let me add that the empirical validity or
invalidity of whatever is conceived as empirical Ricardian equivalence remains
controversial, to say the least (Stanley, 1998; Romer 2011, Ch. 12; Magazzino
2012).
While the present discussion has not dealt with the substantive issue of
government debt, recent theoretical contributions suggest that permanent gov-
ernment debt may be necessary for maintaining macroeconomic stability.
• Domar (1944) has shown in a classical contribution that government
debt will eventually grow with the growth rate of the economy if new
government debt is a fixed proportion of income.
• Schlicht (2006) considers the case that the real rate of interest cannot be
lowered to a level that would be compatible with full employment. Under
these circumstances. permanent public debt is necessary to maintain
full employment. Building on Domar, he shows that the debt/GDP ratio
stabilizes at a level that maintains full employment, even for the case
that the rate of interest exceeds the growth rate. This debt/GDP ratio is
negatively related to the share of public expenditure in GDP, and none of
the intertemporal budgets constraints given by Barro (1974) are violated.
• Godley and Lavoie (2007) show that the goals of full employment and price
stability may necessitate government debt, and the debt/GDP ratio will
not explode even if the rate of interest net of taxes exceeds the growth rate.
• Skott and Ryoo (2011b) and Skott and Ryoo (2011a) show that fiscal policy
and public debt are needed to avoid dynamic inefficiency and maintain
full employment.
• von Weizsäcker (2011) considers the problem from a more fundamental
perspective, that of Austrian capital theory. He calibrates the average
waiting periods for production and consumption and concludes that “the
equilibrium risk free real rate of interest (Wicksell´s ’natural rate of inter-
est’) is negative for the OECD+China area.” As price stability precludes
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a negative real rate of interest, debt-financed government spending can
align the waiting periods for production, consumption, and government
spending under such circumstances.
All such arguments rule out that public debt is, as a first approximation and
given the time-path of government spending, irrelevant for price stability and
employment. The Ricardian equivalence thesis suggests that such effects in-
dicate irrationality on the part of the consumers and investors. The present
analysis establishes that this claim is wrong. Such behavior may well be rational,
but a positive conclusion cannot be drawn from the analysis presented in this
note.
8 Conclusion
This note has shown that Ricardian equivalence is violated in a growing economy
regardless of the level of the interest. Simply assuming that the agents exhibit
Ricardian behavior leads to a violation of their Ricardian expectations. The
contradiction with Barro’s argument is traceable to Barro’s omission of interest
payments on government debt as part of the households’ disposable income.
It has been urged elsewhere that Ricardian equivalence is quite irrelevant
regarding fiscal policy, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. It is
shown here that the thesis is internally contradictory. From this it would follow
that the thesis cannot even provide a “useful theoretical baseline” (Romer, 2011,
598). Despite its logical appeal and wide-spread acceptance as a theoretical
proposition, it is wrong.
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Appendix
Although all calculations are elementary and can be done by hand, I have added
on the following pages the calculations done in the program Mathematica. This
makes it easier to check the results. Readers who use other algebra programs
will find it easy to adapt the Mathematica code to their particular program.
Below you find the printout of the Mathematica notebook containing the
calculations and proofs for the paper. The original notebook in .nb format is
attached to the present document. It can be processed by Mathematica directly.
The attachment can be retrieved in Adobe Reader by clicking the paperclip or
using the "View" menu: View→ Show/Hide→Navigation panes→ Attachments
and then double-click the file name "Ricardian notebook 3.nb". (Maybe the re-
covery of attachments is slightly different in different versions of Adobe Acrobat
or Adobe Acrobat Reader.)
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Mathematica notebook with the calculations for
Unexpected Consequences of Ricardian Expectations
by Ekkehart Schlicht
Note : all calculations are elementary and can be done by hand.  I have added the calculations done in Mathematica   for
making it easier to check the reults.
An Example (Section 3)
ü Production X and government expenditure G (Eqs. 1 and 2)
Xt : 1  gt X0;
Gt : 1  gt G0;
ü Government debt (Eqs. 5 to 7)
UnprotectD;
Note: The symbol D is natively used by Mathematica for the differential operator. The command Unprotect[D] permits the
use of the symbol D for government debt, in conformity with the symbol in the paper.
Dt :
1  1  gt  G0
g
Note: This defines the function D(t). The following commands check whether D(t) is actually the solution to equation (6).
D0  0
True
Note: The command expression1 == expression2 returns True if expression1 and expression2 are mathematically the same.
SimplifyDt  1  Dt   Gt
True
ü Asymptotic ratio of debt to government expenditure (Eq.8)
Limit DtGt, t  , Assumptions  i  0 && g  0

g
ü Asymptotic ratio of debt to production (Eq. 8)
Limit DtXt, t  , Assumptions  i  0 && g  0
 G0
g X0
ü Share of interest on government debt in the government budget (Eqs. 9 and 10)
Simplify r DtGt  r Dt 
1  gt  1 r 
1  gt g  1  gt  1 r 

True
ü Asymptotic share of interest on debt in the government budget (Eq. 11)
Limit r DtGt  r Dt, t  , Assumptions  i  0 && g  0
r 
g  r 
ü Numerical example after Eq. 11
r 
g  r  . g  0.02 . r  0.04 .   0.10
0.166667
ü Present value of goverment debt (Eq. 12)
Simplify 11  r
t
Dt  g 
1  gt  1
1  rt
G0, Assumptions  r  g && g  0
True
Limit 11  r
t
Dt, t  , Assumptions  r  g && g  0
0
ü Taxes (Eq. 14)
Tt : 1  Gt  r Dt
ü Asymptotic ratio of taxes to production (Eq. 15)
Limit TtXt, t  , Assumptions  i  0 && g  0

g 1    r  G0
g X0
Simplify g 1    r  G0g X0
 1  r  g g 
G0
X0

True
ü Tax increase from pay-as-you-go to debt regime minus interest payments necessary under 
Limit Tt  GtXt 
r Dt
Xt , t  , Assumptions  i  0 && g  0

 G0
X0
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Simplify g  i  G0g Y0

i  g
g 
 G0
Y0

True
ü Present value function (Eq. 17)
x :
t0
 1
1  r
t
xt;
ü Household wealth with balanced budget (Eq. 20)
SimplifyX  G
1  r G0  X0
g  r
ü Disposable income (Eqs. 21 and 22)
Yt : Xt  Tt  r Dt;
Yt
1  gt 1   G0  1  gt X0
SimplifyYt  Xt  1  Gt
True
ü Present value of disposable income (Eq. 23)
SimplifyY

1  r 1   G0  X0
g  r
ü Difference of present values (Eq. 24)
SimplifyY  X  G

1  r  G0
g  r
Solving the Contradiction (Section 4)
ü Present Value of Taxes (Eq. 26)
T
G0  r G0
g  r
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ü Present Value of Government Expenditure (Eq.27)
G
1  r G0
g  r
Arbitrary Growth Paths (Section 6)
Destroy all previous symbols and results and unprotect the symbol D again so it can again be used for denoting government
Quit;
UnprotectD;
ü Replacement for Eq. 7 for arbitrary growth paths
Dt : 
0
1t
 G
D0  0
True
SimplifyDt  1  Dt   Gt
 Gt  
0
1t
 G 
0
t
 G
Note: Mathematica  did not recognize that expression1 equals expression2 here, so it returned an equivalent but simplified
ü Replacement for Eq. 14 for arbitrary growth  paths
Tt : 1   Gt  rt Dt
Tt
1   Gt  rt 
0
1t
 G
ü Replacement for Eq. 21 for arbitrary growth paths (Eq. 30)
Yt : Xt  Tt  rt Dt
Yt
1   Gt  Xt
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